1. The remaining customer channels. This is a real asset but small and rapidly shrinking. It could be of value to RedHat or Novell, but will probably be extinct before the lawsuits are done.   I "feel" for these customers - much as one can "feel" for a business - as I've worked with a few of them.   Mostly they're "innocent" in all of this; a real company with a commitment to customers could help them even as they could become a future asset to SCOX's successor of their interest.

2. The copyrights on Unixware and OpenServer products.  These are real but of not much value in the marketplace.  They should probably go wherever the customer channels go so that interfaces can be written to ease migration of customer data to Linux.

3. The rights to negotiate SysV licenses.  This is de-facto valueless at this point as there is Linux for free and various flavors of BSD available if one wanted to create a proprietary unix.  It's conceivable someone could want to write a new code starting with SysV but it would require a large confluence of unlikely circumstances to be worthwhile.

4. The remaining agency revenue from prior SysV licensees.   This is relatively small.  The license fee goes to Novell and a portion (5%)is returned to SCOX... at least that's how it is supposed to go according to the APA.   I'm not sure what has been happening lately.   It's almost a logical necessity that this, along with the new negotiation rights,  will revert to Novell at the end of it all.  

5. The pure perception - worth brazillion$ - that SCOX has some right and privilege over anything and everything containing the letters "n" and "x". IBM will (very justifiably) not stop at anything short of the utter destruction of this idea. And because the "SCO" name became synonymous with this idea, that means destruction of anything contaminated with "SCO".

6)  SCOX's NASDAQ listing and the interest of its holders in maintaining the illusion of value.  This illusion of value is quite interesting.  The holders seem grimly determined to hold the stock price around $4 and a nominal equity value of about $80M for the company... when the most optimistic assessment of it's real assets, even excluding the liability arising from the matters now under purview of the courts, is well under half of that.   And no-one even marginally sane pretends that there is anything of value (or anything at all, net, for that matter) to be won in the court cases.

This is obviously of some value to those insiders holding.  Quite possibly some still make money jockeying money between accounts.  Others may simply want to hold off writing it off as long as possible.  But all the large holders know that none of them can discard their holdings at any fraction of its titular value.

Actually it's of high entertainment value to watch the stock manipulation in support of that $4 stock price.  Personally I think the SEC hasn't moved on SCOX simply because they break down in hysterical giggles every time they think about it.

7. Roughly $10M in cash.  With large question marks.  Some estimates had SCOX at cash bankruptcy on the last payment due to BSF this month (December 2005) when a "private placement" of two million unregistered shares of stock was "found".   There is some question of whether that 10M actually belongs to SCOX or whether that 2M shares was intended to pay off the BayStar pipe arrangement.

8. Four(!) active court cases.   SCO vs IBM with counterclaims.  SCO vs Novell with counterclaims.  RedHat vs SCO.  SCO vs Autozone.   All of these look like losers for SCOX - possibly with some small technical wins, but none worth much in damages.  And the counterclaims are horrendous for SCOX with Lanham violations asserted by IBM and RedHat all but conceded in open court by SCOX's attorneys.   Sure losers all, but SCO vs IBM had "mojo" and the FUD value which brought MS's attention at the beginning.  The other cases are fallout from that one.